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There is no doubt that the signs of “Confucian re-vival” in China have been manifold since the begin-ning of this century; less clear, however, is the actual
significance of contemporary aspirations toward reactivating
Confucianism’s religious dimension. Given the abolition of
the imperial cult of Heaven, the transformation of the tradi-
tional academies into modern institutions of learning, the re-
duction of ancestor worship, and the refashioning of Tem-
ples of Culture (wenmiao) into tourist destinations, one can
wonder to what extent Confucianism-inspired religiosity
might be today more imaginary than real. Could it not be
said that contemporary discourses rooted in Confucianism
have less to do with the present than with the past or the fu-
ture, both in terms of commemorating ancient rituals and of
dreaming up utopian schemes for their possible restoration?
In fact, the modern perspectives claiming such a prestigious
past can only be properly understood within the context of a
turbulent history that has seen the internal transformation of
society and Western influences interact and alter the overall
religious landscape. Nevertheless, despite a century’s worth of
massive destruction, there is still room for the recomposition
currently taking place in full view, a process that reveals, most
notably, the problematic nature of applying the modern West-
ern concept of “religion” to the Chinese cultural context. (1)
The question now is how we can identify, within the current
upheavals in Chinese society, phenomena that legitimately
attest to a renewal of “religious” Confucianism. The field-
work conducted in conjunction with this study can provide
only an imperfect response to this question. In an environ-
ment still profoundly marked by state policy concerning reli-
gion, it is best to momentarily suspend use of the familiar
categories of the sociology of religion and pay closer empir-
ical attention to a variety of discourses and practices that are
ambiguous by virtue of their multiple meanings and the
rapid societal changes affecting them.
As an example of this new situation, consider the sympto-
matic proliferation of the multivocal term xin (“trust”). This
value denotes a variety of meanings ranging from “trust” to
“belief,” and its fading or absence in social intercourse is
commonly lamented today.
For example, a worker who left his home in Hubei to work
in one of the new industrial loci along the Pearl River Delta
decides one day to quit his job with a state-run shoe manu-
facturer in Dongguan. He opts to take a job in a restaurant
run by a young woman who has embraced Confucian
ideals. Through study of Confucius’s Analects every morn-
ing, both on his own and in groups, he finds a source of
daily fulfilment. 
T h e  C o n t e m p o ra r y  R e v i va l  o f  C o n f u c i a n i s m
Anshen liming or the Religious
Dimension of Confucianism
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1. See the concise portrait sketched by Vincent Goossaert and his excellent bibliography in
“L’invention des ‘religions’ dans la Chine moderne,” in Anne Cheng (ed), La pensée en
Chine aujourd’hui, Paris, Gallimard, 2007, pp. 185-213, ff.
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Since the beginning of the century, the resurgence in Mainland China of what is referred to as “Confucianism” has
included a “religious” dimension. The term “religious” is here used to characterise a variety of explorations where
the quest for “inner peace” also echoes a concern for individual or collective destiny (anshen liming). In order to
understand these phenomena better, this article first examines an individual story that provides insight into what a
Confucian religious experience may be today. This example is then placed within the context of shifting categories
(religion, philosophy, science) once accepted as self-evident but now being questioned by elites and other groups in
society. Finally, to give a sense of various explicit projects oriented towards achieving recognition of Confucianism as
an official and institutionalised religion, the article analyses three such efforts seeking to institute Confucianism
either as a “religion on par with other official religions,” as the “state religion,” or as “civil religion.”
Anshen liming or the Religious Dimension of Confucianism
The working conditions were hard in that factory,” he
explains, “but the problem wasn’t material; in fact, I
made more money there. But at that factory all peo-
ple thought about was money, there was no trust
(xin). I’m much happier here... (2)
At the other end of the social scale, a Guangdong-based en-
trepreneur who is equally committed to the notion of a Con-
fucian renewal also brings up the need for trust, both within
his business, where employees are encouraged to take the
teachings of the classics to heart, and within the larger social
and economic environment. (3)
In noting the various contexts in which this term comes up,
it would be possible to outline a veritable “general economy”
of xin that draws its effectiveness from the resources of tra-
ditional Chinese culture and the imperatives of the new cap-
italist society. Thus, one could highlight three possible
realms for this collective virtue: the dimension of “trust” ex-
pressed in social interactions; the dimension of “credit”
praised in economic relations; and the dimension of “creed”
that permeates religious relations in general. (4) It is within
this context that the concept of “religious,” as it applies to
some aspects of the current vogue for Confucianism, reveals
its specificity but also its limits. 
This study will restrict itself to three aspects of a varied reli-
gious quest, one that is captured well by the common expres-
sion anshen liming, with its emphasis on how finding inner
peace implies concern for both personal and collective des-
tiny. (5) To give an idea of the richness of personal experience
that claims its roots in today’s Confucian religiosity, we will first
consider the individual account of a businesswoman who “con-
verted” to Confucianism after a long and complicated spiritual
quest. Discerning the meaning of the term “religion” that is im-
plicit to such an example will then require situating it within the
context of shifting categories (religion, philosophy, science)
that were once accepted as self-evident but which today are
being questioned by elites and other groups in society. Finally,
in order to give an idea of explicit and deliberate attempts to
grant religious Confucianism official and institutional recogni-
tion, we will analyse three such efforts that are being pursued
according to the logic of Confucianism as a “specific religion,”
as a “State religion,” or as a “civil religion.”“ T he  v ar ie t ie s  of  re l i gi ouse x pe ri enc e”
The Goose Lake, a vegetarian restaurant, is distinguished
only by its name from the swarm of other commercial estab-
lishments that make up the new city of Shenzhen. The only
way to find it is through a friend or someone sharing the
Confucian commitment of its proprietor, Mrs. D. Visitors
are warmly welcomed by a lively woman in her forties who
is prepared to relate her spiritual odyssey with a surprising
combination of fervour and lucidity.
Her story entails a succession of dramatic events that follow
a pattern similar to many religious experiences: that of an ini-
tial illusory happiness followed by a downfall, and then dis-
covery of an arduous path towards salvation. Most relevant
for the purpose of this study, however, is the role played by
Confucianism in the chain of events. (6)
Mrs. D. grew up during the time of transition from the
Maoist era (at 14, she became a member of the dance
troupe of the People’s Liberation Army) to the new society
inaugurated by Deng Xiaoping’s reforms. 
I come from Liaoning Province, and I was born into
a military family without education. It was a genera-
tion that knew only struggle. But what advantage was
there to all that, to the struggle between brothers or
between those on top and those on the bottom? To
this day, my parents are part of the generation that
reveres Mao Zedong, the generation whose spiritual
life (jingshen shenming) was destroyed, a generation
that lacks any peace of mind. 
At age 20, she left the army to look for work in various
cities. Her enterprising spirit and independence proved a
perfect fit for the opportunities offered by the market econ-
omy that prospered during the 1990s. Employed as a wait-
ress in a modest restaurant, she rose to become its propri-
etor, and at 25 joined the envied category of those earning
“more than 10,000 renminbi” a month. Yet the easy life led
to dissipation and anxiety: 
I had all the material things in the world, but my life
was a living hell. I went wild, I made lots of mistakes,
you know. When one has no education, no religion,
no humanity (zuo ren) but lots of money, one can eas-
ily go wild. A normal person who commits a crime or
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2. Interview, Shenzhen, June 2007.
3. Interview, Guangzhou, June 2006.
4. The analysis of such an “economy of xin” is the object of a work in progress.
5. On this notion see the collective work Anshen liming yu dongxi wenhua (Anshen liming and Western
and Oriental cultures), Hong Kong, Fazhu chubanshe, 1992.
6. Interviews, Shenzhen, June 2007.
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a sin (fanzui) has regrets (chanhui), right? Not me. I
couldn’t care less. My life was out of control, I was in-
capable of thinking rationally (lixing de sikao). I fig-
ured out that money couldn’t solve my problems and
I became superstitious (mixin).
Her escape from this period of dereliction came through an
encounter with Buddhism, when an initiate led her to under-
stand that she was heading towards her ruin: “It’s as if you
were dead. You could have a new life but I am not the one
who can help you: you need to start off by reading the Bud-
dhist sutras.” 
For three years my life was governed by Buddhism,
and I became different from the people around me. 
I came to understand that my bad acts (eguo) were
the fruit of a bad heart (exin). People can be trans-
formed from living in a state of confusion to attaining
a state of understanding by Buddhism. I read the su-
tras on my own, but because of my life experience 
I came to understand them. Buddhism is not a reli-
gion: it’s not a matter of commandments — it’s a set
of teachings. People ask God for things. You don’t
ask Buddha for anything. It’s a profound teaching fo-
cused on achieving enlightenment, on becoming a
sage. An ordinary person can become a Buddha.
There’s no superstition, but rather Buddhism sets in
motion a genuine transformation.
This rupture marked the beginning of a new existence that
initially bewildered her friends and family. 
Today, I have no possessions, no car, no fixed salary.
I’m not concerned about money, and my parents still
think I’m crazy! I don’t care.
However, her discovery of Buddhism was only the first step
toward apparent redemption. What she now believes to be
her life’s definitive orientation emerged through the Confu-
cianism inspired by the teachings of the Taiwanese philoso-
pher Wang Caigui. She first discovered Wang through a se-
ries of CDs promoting the recitation of the Confucian clas-
sics that she bought for her daughter. A disciple of the fa-
mous philosopher Mou Zongsan, Wang became a major in-
fluence on Mrs. D.’s life. She met him in person in 2004
and subsequently devoted herself to spreading Confucian
teachings among both children and adults. Her business es-
tablished recitation courses for children, which began to at-
tract members of her staff as well. In addition, many of her
clients and their friends have also attended conferences she
organises on the virtues of Confucian education. (7)
However, her commitment to Confucianism has greatly ex-
ceeded her educative efforts. Her meeting with the Tai-
wanese thinker convinced her that Confucian teaching is
destined for humanity as a whole (renlei de mingyun):
If Confucianism were just one more set of teachings
(yi men), just another ideology, it wouldn’t be worth
studying. It is not just for scholars, it is the path by
which all of humanity can find refuge (renlei guisu de
fangxiang). There are no racial or religious borders:
Confucianism can solve the problems of the entire
world…
Despite its unique aspects, Mrs. D.’s experience raises cer-
tain questions concerning the distinctly religious dimension
of Confucianism. The first thing to point out is that her ad-
herence to Confucianism can only be understood as a kind
of conversion. This deliberate embrace of the ideals of Con-
fucian wisdom was preceded by a period of crisis and break-
down. It came about only after a long spiritual journey that
began with “superstition” (she remains silent about the de-
tails) followed by a drawing on the resources of Buddhism.
This kind of odyssey is relatively rare among businesspeople
who turn to Confucianism. We mentioned elsewhere the ex-
ample in Zhuhai of the “Pinghe academy,” which provided
a communal lifestyle to a small group of initiates and engen-
dered a network of followers. (8) Its founder and director was
a prosperous businessman whose enthusiasm for Confucian-
ism followed a period of time spent in the United States,
where he embraced the Baha’i faith. However, it is much
more common for businesspeople to develop an interest in
Confucianism to complement or enhance their professional
striving rather than as a refuge in the wake of personal cri-
sis. For some, studying the Confucian classics and attending
academic conferences represents a crowning achievement of
a life of business success, one that satisfies both a desire for
more intellectual pursuits and aspirations towards less mate-
rialistic values. For others, a more occasional involvement of-
fers the chance to display one’s cultural and social capital. 
We also need to note the special role Buddhism played in
Mrs. D.’s story. This aspect of her experience was not re-
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7. See Sébastien Billioud and Joël Thoraval, “Jiaohua: The Confucian Revival Today as an Educative
Project,” China Perspectives, no. 2007/4, p. 14.
8. Ibid, p. 13.
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Anshen liming or the Religious Dimension of Confucianism
jected but rather amplified and reoriented by her acceptance
of Confucianism. From her perspective, it’s a matter of
restoring the common spirit underlying both traditions while
highlighting the superiority of Confucianism:
We shouldn’t exaggerate the difference between the
way of the bodhisattva (pusa) and that of the sage
(shengxian). They’re just two words to designate the
same thing. The two teachings are rooted in real life.
When one becomes a bodhisattva, what else can be
the focus of one’s attention? It’s not a question of
worrying only about oneself, of trying to escape life’s
vicissitudes (fannao) or seeking a Western Paradise
(Xitian). It’s the same with Confucianism. Lots of
people study for their own benefit (weile geren), for
academic reasons (xueshu). That’s the attitude of a
petty person (xiaoren); those people are phoney Con-
fucians (ruzhe). You can’t turn your back on society... 
Such a perspective combines some very ancient elements with
more contemporary preoccupations. Without dwelling on the
history of the symbiotic yet equally tense relations between
the two traditions since the neo-Confucian reform of the
Song, it is well known how important Buddhism was to the re-
fashioning of a modern Confucianism at the end of the Em-
pire and during the Republican era. At a time when the insti-
tutional structures of Confucianism were gradually being dis-
mantled, many scholars saw in Buddhism the only possible
counterweight to the power of the West because of the com-
plexity of its theoretical constructions and its involvement in
charitable activities. Occasionally, this doctrine of non-vio-
lence could also, paradoxically, provide the basis for national-
istic mobilisation. (9) Moreover, Buddhism could constitute an
individual response to the existential crises engendered by so-
cial upheaval without contradicting a Confucian commitment
towards society. In fact, through her references to Liang
Shuming, our restaurant owner is fully aware of aligning her-
self with this dual heritage. (10)
Since the beginning of the century, additional factors favour-
ing symbiosis between Buddhism and Confucianism have
become clear. On the mainland, many of the websites and
publications propagating the Confucian classics are actually
the work of Buddhists. Such an alliance results from a com-
bination of conviction and calculus: conviction, because of a
belief in adapting instruction to match the level of under-
standing of the potential public (an example being the works
of the Taiwanese master Nan Huaijin (11)); and calculus, be-
cause Buddhism’s recognition as an official religion theoret-
ically precludes all attempts at proselytising. In presenting it-
self with a Confucian face, Buddhist teachings can appear
more like a call to greater wisdom and morality in the spirit
of traditional national culture.
Mrs. D.’s experience raises another question, one concern-
ing the legitimisation of the teachings that have transformed
her life. This question brings the particular and ambiguous
role of the master to the fore. Mrs. D. tends minimise that
role, stressing Confucianism as a process of self-liberation: 
The big mistake people make studying Buddhism is to
want to escape the world; the big mistake when it
comes to Confucianism is to claim to be a master.
Until one gets past these temptations, there is no pos-
sibility of assimilating the true doctrine (zhenzheng
de xuewen). Obeying one’s teacher is not the impor-
tant thing; what’s most important is following one’s
“original nature” (benxin). That is the greatness of
Confucianism (rujia de weida). 
As will become apparent once we consider the use of the
term “religion,” this attitude can be explained in part by the
desire not to conflate Confucian teaching (jiao) with the
conception of a religious institution (zongjiao) introduced by
the Christian West. Just as one does not “obey” a God or a
Buddha, one does not “obey” a master whose role is only to
facilitate one’s own self-realisation. Such theoretical down-
playing of the importance of a master is the flip side of a
practical valourisation that can take on extreme forms. Since
meeting Wang Caigui, Mrs. D. has remained in regular con-
tact with her teacher. This long-distance communication
with the master involves for her more than asking for advice
over the telephone or by email: 
Our communication is brief, but every time we do get
in touch with each other, I have the feeling that it is
a matter of reciprocal resonance (xiangying). That’s
something I can feel during meditation. The master
has a transcendent existence (chaoyue de cunzai) —
he’s always present...
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9. See in particular Chan Sin-wai, Buddhism in Late Ch’ing Political Thought, Hong Kong, Chinese
University Press, 1985.
10. For an explanation by Liang Shuming of the relations between Confucianism and Buddhism, cf. the
interview with Wang Zongyu, “Shi rujia haishi fojia?” (Confucian or Buddhist?), Zhongguo wenhua
yu Zongguo zhexue, Beijing, Dongfang chubanshe, 1986, pp. 560-565.
11. Born in Wenzhou in 1918, Nan Huaijin had a career in the military during the Republican era before
devoting himself to the study of different schools of Buddhism. He left for Taiwan in 1949, and since
1990 has maintained business and teaching activities on the mainland. 
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This form of mediation on the master’s part is probably why
Mrs. D. attributes such efficacy to Confucianism. Essen-
tially, her encounter with Buddhism was as an autodidact,
reading sutras and commentaries by unknown masters on
her own and leading an existence that set her apart from her
immediate peers. However, the intercession of a living Con-
fucian master provides both confirmation of her spiritual vo-
cation (“you have attained the necessary level or jingjie”)
and the possibility of situating herself within a lineage of
masters whose legitimacy stemmed from association with
past and living sages. Asked about such a lineage, she men-
tions most notably Wang Yangming, Liang Shuming, Mou
Zongsan, and her present master. It is clear that she per-
ceives a continuum between a true master and the sage
whose life is an embodiment of Confucian teaching.
A final element is the horizon of expectation that the teach-
ing instils among initiates. There are certainly different de-
grees of initiation between restaurant employees who are
grateful for the solace derived from their daily reading of the
classics and the wealthier parents who are ready to pull their
kids out of the normal school system in order to place them
within a new community where education is conceived of as
a true “incorporation” of the deeper meaning of the Confu-
cian classics. (12) It is among this minority of followers that de-
votion is most likely to reach a messianic pitch. This utopian
perspective expresses itself in a threefold manner. One
finds, first of all, more reverence for the master than for the
head of the family, an affirmation of the greater legitimacy
of shidao (way of the master) than xiaodao (filial piety):
“One’s teacher is more important than one’s parents; one’s
parents give the gift of life, but one’s teacher gives the gift
of wisdom.” Such reverence for the master additionally en-
genders a sentiment of particular urgency, given the discon-
tinuity introduced by the communist and post-communist
eras. “Today our master is 57 years old. If we are unable to
educate our children according to his principles, the future
of Confucianism is at risk.” The voluntary relinquishing of
parental authority over children receiving the new education
leads to the opening of a glorious horizon: “They are not our
children, they are the nation’s children (minzu), humanity’s
children (renlei).” This vision includes a trans-generational
dream: “Children who have studied the classics will inter-
marry and raise their own children.” These moments of ex-
altation reveal a comprehensive vision of humanity being re-
vitalised thanks to what could be referred to as the produc-
tion of saints and sages. It is all the more remarkable since,
despite the warm-heartedness of the actions pursued, there
is a permanent denouncing to parents of the prevailing soci-
etal pollution (wuran) that irremediably poisons both the
predominant educational system and mass communication,
and from which children must be shielded. 
While there is always the risk of this type of movement turn-
ing into a sect, it is seldom found among the diverse groups
calling for a Confucian revival today.Appropriations of and challengesto modern categorisation
The only way to understand the as yet embryonic re-emer-
gence of a Confucianism claiming to be religious is to see how
it fits into an already ancient history in which the modern
Western notion of “religion” plays a fundamental role in the
redefinition of modern Chinese civilisation. This debate has
its own form of prehistory, beginning with the confrontation
between imperial China and Europe from the sixteenth to the
eighteenth centuries, during which the problem of the reli-
gious specificity of Confucianism was already an issue: the
“Rites Controversy,” the product of the audacious interpreta-
tions of Jesuit missionaries, stands as an early testimony to the
complex and ambivalent dialogue that characterised early con-
tact between China and the West. The dramatic nature of the
transformations at the end of the Manchu Dynasty, however,
is embodied in the context of Western imperialism and the su-
premacy of a type of Western knowledge that the Chinese
feel obliged to embrace for the sake of their own survival. It
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12. On the role of the body, children, and the people in this education, see Sébastien Billioud and Joël
Thoraval, “Jiaohua: The Confucian Revival Today as an Educative Project,” op.cit., pp. 14-21.
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of masters. 
Wang Yangming Liang Shuming Mou Zongsan 
Anshen liming or the Religious Dimension of Confucianism
is not possible within the limits of this study to comprehen-
sively review this complex history; we can only recall a few es-
sential characteristics that still have consequences today.
A  teac hi ng  in  sea rc h  of  c atego ri es
It is striking how the notion of “religion,” previously unknown
in China, was introduced as part of an aggregate of concepts
— “religion,” “science,” “politics,” “fine arts,” “literature,”
“philosophy” — constituting the fundamental structure of Eu-
ropean culture and society. The only way to define one con-
cept was in terms of its standing relative to all the others.
Their introduction over a remarkably short period of time,
thanks primarily to the mediation of Meiji era Japan, re-
quired a wholesale reorganisation of the cultural and social
order in China, including the destruction and reinvention of
entire branches of Chinese civilisation. At the risk of being
too schematic, it is possible to reconstruct — in a logical rather
than chronological fashion, since the steps of this evolution
overlap — the different stages of this confrontation between
Confucian heritage and the new category of religion.
The first period witnessed a determined resistance, stem-
ming from the allegiance of the imperial state and the literati
to Confucian tradition and the indigenous and inclusive cat-
egory of jiao (teaching), as opposed to the more exclusive
neologism zongjiao, the translation of the European notion
of “organised religion.” It is too infrequently acknowledged
that what this confrontation particularly called into question
was not the general idea of “Western religion,” but rather
the modern category of religion, which is the fruit of a pro-
gressively secularised Europe. Whereas the Emperor
Yongzhen, when faced with missionary activity during the
eighteenth century, believed he could situate Christian
monotheism along with Confucianism within the overall
Chinese category of jiao (teaching), the imperial state at the
turn of the twentieth century was challenged in its decline by
a set of institutions, whether churches, religious sects, insti-
tutions of higher learning and universities, or even political
movements, that were differentiated and relatively au-
tonomous in terms of their respective values. The ancient
Confucian teaching that ritualistically encompassed concep-
tions of cosmic and political orders as well as prescriptions
of ethical and social norms, confronted a more narrowly de-
termined institutional framework: the European religious
subsystem, restructured within a social context characterised
by secularisation and the new democratic horizon.
By the end of the Empire there was a growing distinction
between what was considered a matter of “knowledge”
(xue) and what concerned “teaching” (jiao), which, be-
cause of the growing importance of Western science and
technology, began to take on a more restrictive meaning,
primarily linked to the fundamental values of Chinese tra-
dition. (13) In this light, the last years of the imperial era
witnessed a brief and striking differentiation of the cultural
and religious dimensions of ancient heritage. Whereas the
suppression of the exam system in 1905 marked the end
of a crucial institution of the Confucian cultural order, and
by the same token, the demise of certain forms of “learn-
ing,” Confucianism paradoxically took on a new pre-emi-
nence as a kind of state religion (guojiao) through the un-
precedented promotion of the cult of Confucius to a status
equal to the high imperial ritual worship of Heaven and
Earth.
After 1911, the creation of the Republic inevitably created a
quandary for defenders of the traditional inclusive notion of
teaching (baojiao) such as Kang Youwei. Ambiguity had
still been an acceptable possibility when Liang Qichao, in
exile in Japan, defended the reform projects of his mentor,
promoted to the rank of a Confucian Luther. For a brief
time it remained credible to argue that the person who was
primarily responsible for introducing to China the Japanese
neologism for religion (shukyô) used it in a way that pre-
served the more comprehensive ancient concept of jiao. The
point was less to highlight Kang’s presumed embrace of re-
ligion than to justify his complete transformation of Confu-
cianism into a set of worldly goals (egalitarianism, progres-
sivism, altruism, etc.). (14) If such ambiguity became increas-
ingly untenable, it was not only because of an evolution of
the intellectual debate — in fact, since 1902 Liang Qichao
had already refused to consider Confucius a religious fig-
ure (15) — but mainly due to the new political regime. Hence-
forth, the drafting of a republican constitution required de-
termining in precise legal terms the future status of Confu-
cianism in China: was it a doctrine capable of becoming a
state religion? The constitutional debates, overshadowed by
political turmoil, only reached a compromise formula that
was soon made irrelevant by the more radical secularism in-
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13. The proposition by Wang Zhao, who was, in fact, an adversary of Kang Youwei, to create in 1898 a
ministry of Confucian teaching (jiaobu) distinct from the ministry of education (xuebu) already pro-
vides an illustration of this situation. See Hsi-yuan Chen, Confucianism Encounters Religion: The
Formation of Religious Discourse and the Confucian Movement in Modern China, Doctoral thesis in
History and East Asian Languages, Harvard, UMI Microform 9936192, 1999, p. 89.
14. Ibid., p. 62.
15. On the complex evolution of Liang Qiachao’s position on religion, see Marianne Bastid-Bruguière,
“Liang Qichao yu xongjiao wenti” (Liang Qichao and the problem of religion), in Hazama Naoki (ed),
Liang Qichao, Meiji Riben, Xifang (Liang Qichao, Meiji Japan, and the West), 2001, Beijing, Shehui
kexue wenxian chubanshe, pp. 400-457. 
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troduced by both the Nationalist and the Communist par-
ties. (16)
It is during this period that the term Kongjiao, already in cir-
culation at the end of the Empire, definitively began to des-
ignate what could be called a “Confucian religion,” complete
with the reference to Confucius. Ironically, the Western in-
vention of “Confucianism” by nineteenth century scholars
using the universal religions of Jesus and Mohammed as
models finally became a reality on Chinese soil. Founded in
1912, the Confucian Association (Kongjiaohui) grew rap-
idly during the first years of the Republic under the leader-
ship of one of Kang Youwei’s disciples, Chen Huanzhang
(1880-1933): two years after its creation there were 132
branches both in and outside China. (17) The Confucian As-
sociation engaged in a kind of mimetic rivalry with Protes-
tantism through its attempts to concoct ritual equivalents
such as vestments, symbols, religious holidays, and weekly
religious services that assembled what were referred to as
believers (jiaotu). (18)
From this period on, affirming a Confucian religion within
Chinese political space entailed providing answers to three
questions that would re-emerge in different terms at the be-
ginning of the twenty-first century: How to reconcile aspira-
tion towards the pre-eminence of a state religion with the ne-
cessity of freedom of religion? How to ensure that any pro-
motion of Confucianism does not weaken the unity of the
new nation, given the religious traditions of certain non-Han
groups (Tibetan Buddhism, Islam)? What sort of public
places of worship could fill the void after the destruction or
transformation of previously essential institutions such as the
Temples of Culture and the ancient academies (shuyuan)?
One word should be said about this final concern, since it
actually reflects some sort of “prejudice” of the educated
elite regarding the possibility of disseminating Confucianism
among the masses, the effects of which were felt throughout
the twentieth century. 
Indeed, in the1920s, a common preoccupation of the
learned class concerning the dissemination of “religious
Confucianism” was the fear that the Chinese masses
might not be up to it. This is more than a little paradoxi-
cal, given the way Confucianism permeated society during
centuries of imperial rule. (19) The anxiety of the elites
grew along with a certain nostalgia for the traditional in-
stitutions they frequented — the temples and academies —
that once legitimated the shidafu’s dominant position in
society. As their sociological status underwent a progres-
sive change throughout the new Republican order, these
elites became politicians, intellectuals, or academics, and
henceforth paid only secondary attention to the vast uni-
verse of popular worship in ancestral temples or local cul-
tural associations. But was there not significant food for
thought in the vitality of the practices of the ancestral ci-
tang, where the ritual classics continued to be interpreted
by the most educated members of the local community?
This distancing of itself from the ordinary practices cen-
tered on kinship by an elite growing progressively urban
and orienting itself towards a national horizon combined
with a traditional wariness toward folk beliefs considered
“superstitious” or heretical. Consequently, the new Con-
fucian religion committed itself to regaining control of and
restructuring the “de-Confucianised” rural world in order
to protect it from the seductive appeal of Christian
churches and sects, which were particularly active in edu-
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16. Far from endorsing proposals for the establishment of Confucianism as a state religion (guojia), arti-
cle 11 of the 1923 constitution limited itself to indicating, in vague terms, that the citizens of the
Republic of China enjoy the “freedom to revere Confucius and to practice any religion...in conform-
ity with the law.” Hsi-yuan Chen, Confucianism Encounters Religion, op. cit., p. 187.
17. On Chen Huanzhang’s ideas, see Nicolas Zufferey, “Chen Huanzhang et l’invention d’une religion
confucianiste au début de l’époque républicaine,” and on the context of this discussion, see V.
Goossaert, “Les mutations de la religion confucianiste, 1898-1937,” in Flora Blanchon and Rang-Ri
Park-Barjot (ed), Le nouvel âge de Confucius, Paris, Presses Universitaires de Paris-Sorbonne, 2007,
pp. 173-188,163-172.
18. Gan Chunsong emphasises the influence that Christianity was able to have on the development and
transformation of “indigenous religions” and particularly Confucianism. He also provides more detail
on the organisation of this Confucian religion. Gan Chunsong, “Cong Kang Youwei dao Chen
Huanzhang” (From Kang Youwei to Chen Huanzhang) in Gan Chunsong (ed), Rujia, rujiao, yu zhong-
guo zhidu ziyuan, Nanchang, Jiangxi chuban jituan, 2007, p. 35 ff and pp. 75-76.
19. Thus Yan Fu observes that, despite its hold on society since the Han Dynasty, Confucianism never
became a popular faith: “Yan Fu noted that “most females and children know about the ideas of
heaven, hell, Buddha and Yama’ but none of them has ever heard the names of any of Confucius’s
disciples.” Chen Hsi-yuan, Confucianism Encounters Religion, op.cit., p. 85.
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cation and charitable work. (20) To a certain extent, it was
not until the emergence of another intellectual community,
the brilliant Chinese school of sociology and anthropology
of the 1930s and 1940s, that the panoply of Chinese be-
liefs and practices could be reconstituted in a coherent
fashion, independent of modern policies concerning “be-
liefs,” “religion,” and “superstition.”
During this second period of encounter between Confucian
heritage and the new category of religion, the failure of a re-
ligious Confucianism based on Western models is linked to
the triumph throughout the 1920s of an alternative Western
conceptual category, that of science (kexue). Indeed, it is on
this category that a significant portion of the new intelli-
gentsia began increasingly to rely in evaluating China’s cul-
tural heritage. (21) A debate, launched most notably by figures
of the May Fourth Movement in their review Xin qingnian,
resulted in a denial of any legitimate role for religion in the
new China, whether in a Christian or newfound Confucian
form, all in the name of science. By 1930, the Confucian
Association was no longer attracting new elites, and Chen
Huanzhang left the mainland for Hong Kong, where his
movement was perpetuated to the present. Moreover, as
Zheng Jiadong has pointed out, the majority of specialised
publications avoided discussing Confucianism in terms of
“religion” until 1950. (22) Henceforth the majority of aca-
demic publications relied on secular terminology to charac-
terise Confucianism, preferring terms such as “school”
(rujia) or “knowledge” (ruxue). As for the “religion of Con-
fucius,” it fell into a lasting decline. 
The anti-religious polemic engendered yet a third turn in the
conceptualisation of Confucianism, one that saw the ascen-
dance of the category of “philosophy” (zhexue). Inspired by
the Meiji era example of Inoue Tetsujirô and his peers, lead-
ing scholars such as Wang Guowei already by the end of the
imperial era considered “philosophy” the Western concep-
tual category most applicable to traditional Confucian schol-
arship. A proliferation of modern universities, leading to the
establishment of academic exchanges with Europe and the
United States along with a confrontation with the great
Western philosophical systems, gave birth to a golden age of
new “Chinese philosophy,” one most famously embodied in
the work of Feng Youlan, a scholar capable of both system-
atising and conceptualising Confucian doctrine while at the
same time tracing back its genealogy. However, the most sig-
nificant flowering of “philosophical Confucianism” occurred
in the relative exile of Hong Kong and Taiwan in the work
of major thinkers such as Mou Zongsan. It was only half a
century later that that the impoverishment of the ancient no-
tion of “teaching” through transformation into an academic
discipline would become fully apparent.
A veil of amnesia shrouded the complexity of this evolution
as a result of the virulent anti-Confucianism of the Maoist
era that reached its most convulsive stage during the Cultural
Revolution. When acknowledged at all, Confucius was re-
ferred to simply as an “educator” (jiaoyujia). Thus it fell
upon young historians of the post-Mao era to resurrect the
memory of the three key phases of contemporary Confucian-
ism’s development that we have just presented: the resist-
ance to foreign influence mounted in the name of Confu-
cianism as a comprehensive teaching (jiao) fusing diverse di-
mensions of experience; the temptation to concoct a fully ec-
clesiastic Confucianism (Kongjiao); and finally, what can be
characterised as a formal withdrawal into the “consolation of
philosophy,” seeking refuge in allegiance to a system of ab-
stractions in the name of an ideal of wisdom. 
F lu id ity r ecl aimed:  Th e  ques tio ni n g oft wenti eth  c en tu ry  c at eg or is atio n
Beginning in the 1980s, “Confucianism” progressively ac-
quired a new visibility. The traditional concept of compre-
hensive teaching (jiao), however, resurfaced only in a frag-
mented and mutilated form in the erudite writings of the ac-
ademic world after 30 years of radical critique. Even though
the policy of reform and opening did allow for a gradual re-
appropriation of Confucian intellectual developments out-
side the mainland, particularly from Hong Kong and Tai-
wan, the task of reconstruction nevertheless remained con-
fined to the world of historians, literary critics, and philoso-
phers in academia. Most notably, it was divorced from devel-
opments at the village level, where there was a gradual
reestablishment, despite formal illegality, of rituals linked to
ancestral temples and local communities. Thus, at the begin-
ning of the 1990s, in the wake of the events of Tiananmen
Square, it came as a surprise when a young anthropologist
from Shanghai, Qian Hang, rediscovered the vitality of prac-
tices associated with ancestor worship in the southern
provinces. He had originally been sent by the Shanghai
Academy of Social Sciences to investigate the persistence of
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20. Chen Hsi-yuan also points out that Chen Huanzhang’s program is oriented towards youth, workers
and merchants, women, and villages. Ibid., pp. 223-224. Similar ambitions are common among
advocates of the current Confucian revival.
21. D.W.Y. Kwok, Scientism in Chinese Thought, 1900-1950, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1965.
22. On this problem, see Zheng Jiadong, “Rujia sixiang de zongjiaoxing wenti” (The problem of the reli-
gious dimension of Confucian thought), in Dangdai xinruxue lunheng (Essays on Contemporary Neo-
Confucianism), 1995, Taipei, Guiguan, pp. 171-233.
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disruptive “feudal” customs such as xiedou, traditional
vendettas between rival lineage groups. Instead, Qian re-
ported on constructive gatherings of clan elders and local of-
ficials in ancestral temples to discuss problems of daily vil-
lage life that eluded solution through socialist legislation (for
example, questions concerning property and the common
use of ancient citang: are these rights assigned to the entire
village or to descendants of the same ancestor?). He con-
cluded that this form of conflict resolution was more peace-
ful and reasonable due to the vitality of cultural traditions
preserved by educated villagers. These practices, which con-
stituted some remnants of “popular Confucianism,” re-
mained largely anthropological curiosities: urban academics,
in their fixation on learned analyses of texts and discussion
of values and concepts derived from traditional culture, were
mostly oblivious to these village-level phenomena. (23)
The first years of the new century, on the other hand, have
sparked a growing cross- fertilisation of Chinese society as a
result of rapid development, greater social mobility, and the
importance of new means of communication. An increased
fluidity of exchange, both material and intellectual, has trig-
gered a re-examination of received categories of thought.
The institutionalised categories that officially delineated the
remnants of “Confucian” tradition have taken on an unnatu-
ral and even problematic status. This relative weakening of
basic conceptual foundations is the result of a double process
of scrutiny taking place simultaneously at the summit and
grassroots level of society. On the one hand, certain aca-
demic elites question the legitimacy of the disciplinary divi-
sion that has fragmented the ancient “national studies”
(guoxue) to the point that their meaning and internal coher-
ence are rendered unintelligible; for example, the creation of
a “Guoxueyuan” at the People’s University in 2002 led to
debate concerning the perverse effects of scientific speciali-
sation based on the Western model that prevents an ap-
proach to texts that simultaneously mobilises literary, histor-
ical, and philosophical perspectives. (24) On the other hand,
a growing number of movements promote a “Confucian re-
vival” at the grassroots level. While these groups often resort
to vague and uncertain language and practices, they are still
casting off the old academic classifications.
A clearer understanding of the apparently religious dimen-
sion of the current “popular Confucianism” (minjian rujia)
requires examining specific examples. Indeed, the new
meanings for the category of “religion” will become clearer
by comparing a few cases that demonstrate an unexpected
use of the two contemporary categories of “philosophy” and
“science.” If these categories merit our attention, it is due
not only to their classificatory function, but also to their per-
formative role. They do not merely differentiate the content
of a pre-existing Confucian teaching; they also actively mod-
ify the reality they qualify. Treating Confucianism as either
religion, philosophy, or knowledge naturally transforms it
into as many new dimensions. Categorisation interests us be-
cause it is synonymous with practice and the demand for in-
stitutions.
Elsewhere we have discussed the problems and even contra-
dictions generated during the twentieth century by the cre-
ation of “Confucian philosophy” based on the European
philosophical model. The creation of remarkable philosoph-
ical systems by “contemporary neo-Confucian” thinkers
who, like Mou Zongsan, worked mainly in university set-
tings, resulted in an intellectualisation of traditional teach-
ings. Whereas the old Confucian “academies” (shuyuan) fo-
cused as much on the body as on the mind, the “contempo-
rary neo-Confucians” fashioned metaphysical systems to
rival European speculative philosophy, while amputating the
physical and symbolic aspects of their tradition. Self-transfor-
mation and sagehood remained a central topic of the new
philosophical Confucianism, but these ideals were somehow
divorced from the means of their realisation: in becoming
pure philosophy cultivated in the context of the modern uni-
versity, the neo-Confucian message of wisdom was at least
partially stripped of its conditions (cultural or anthropologi-
cal) of possibility. This academic appropriation of Confu-
cianism during the twentieth century was resisted by schol-
ars such as Ma Yifu or Liang Shuming, who in their own
way remained faithful to the ideals of the traditional acade-
mies. In that respect, we have evoked the emergence of a
veritable “Confucian anti-philosophy.” (25) At the beginning
of the twenty-first century, this development has become the
focus of renewed interest, even within mainstream philo-
sophical circles.
Observation of the diverse “popular” movements (minjian)
reveals some unexpected developments taking place outside
of the usual academic framework. Returning to the example
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23. Qian Hang, Chuantong yu zhuanxing: Jiangxi Qinhe nongcun zongzu xingtai (Tradition and transfor-
mation: Village lineage structures in Qinhe, Jiangxi Province), 1995, Shanghai shehui kexueyuan
chubanshe. On this particular example and its importance, cf. Joël Thoraval, “The Anthropologist and
the Question of the ‘Visibility’ of Confucianism in Contemporary Chinese Society,” China
Perspectives, 23 (1999), pp. 65-73.
24. See Sébastien Billioud and Joël Thoraval, “Jiaohua: The Confucian Revival Today as an Educative
Project,” op.cit., pp. 8-10.
25. Joël Thoraval, “Confucian experience and philosophical discourse: Reflections on some aporiae in
contemporary neo-Confucianism,” China Perspectives, no. 42, July-August, 2002, pp. 62-81; “Sur
la transformation de la pensée néo-confucéene en discours philosophique moderne,” Extrême-
Orient, Extrême Occident, 27 (2005), pp. 91-119.
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of the restaurant owner in Shenzhen cited above, we can
add that her missionary work is not limited to reading the
Confucian classics or following the teachings of her Tai-
wanese mentor. Her library contains most of the well-
known works by Mou Zongsan, which she pushes herself to
read despite her lack of philosophical training. However,
her relationship with these texts is not one of a student
studying an illustrious philosopher. “Master Mou is a sage
(shengxian), not a scholar (xuezhe). He indicates the way
for all of humanity (renlei de fangxiang).” Aware of having
indirectly embraced a prestigious line of descent stretching
back to the sages of antiquity and to major Confucian fig-
ures of the Song and Ming dynasties, as noted above, Mrs.
D. fuses her study of difficult texts such as the Xinti yu
xingti (Constitutive Mind and Constitutive Nature) with
her personal practice of self-transformation and proselytism.
For the authors of this study, who have both written on
Mou Zongsan in the past, it is a genuinely strange experi-
ence to be confronted with such a non-academic and uncon-
ventional interpretation of writings that, by reputation, rep-
resent the most rigorously philosophical form of modern
Confucianism, impregnated as they are by both the logic of
the Anglo-Saxon tradition and the philosophy of Kant.
What this experience makes plain is how philosophical texts
can be read in non-philosophical ways. Despite its progres-
sive abstraction into pure “metaphysics,” Mou Zongsan’s
work reveals itself to be sufficiently inspirational as a radi-
cal call to wisdom, akin to the school of heart and mind
(xinxue) and reinforced by concepts from Tiantai Bud-
dhism that are open to unexpected appropriations defying
the norms of the academic world.
This example is far from unique. We can cite another of
someone who yearns for a Confucian revival among ordi-
nary people and remains outside the university sphere while
having been influenced by it. A resident of Jiangsu
province, M. L. went to Shandong along with activists from
other provinces, whom he met online or through third par-
ties, to participate in ceremonies commemorating Confu-
cius’s birthday, rituals intended to reflect popular religious
practices as opposed to the official celebration organised in
the Temple of Confucius in Qufu. Thus, dressed in Ming
dynasty garb, he officiated at a service in nearby Zoucheng
at the temple dedicated to Mengzi, the Yashengmiao, along
with others hoping to revive traditional ritual practices. (26)
While he has never had the chance to be a scholar, M.L.
has deepened his understanding of the classics on his own
thanks to the guidance of Luo Yijun, a well-known Shang-
hai intellectual and disciple of Mou Zongsan. (27) M.L. is ac-
tive back home in the movement led by Wang Caigui to
teach children the classics through recitation. He also tries
to get young people to read philosophical works by Mou
Zongsan. His approach is to insist upon the close link be-
tween learning a text and personal practice: 
When one reads Mou Zongsan, one must come to a
unity of reading and effort (gongfu). One must not
read like so many professors, who read in a unilateral
(pianmian) way. You can’t read Mou like you read
Kant. Of course, Mou is influenced by Kant, but his
own thought remains perfectly in tune with the lixue
of the Song and Ming dynasties.
M.L. does not hesitate to criticise the interpretations of fa-
mous scholars in Taiwan, professors “who no longer under-
stand much because of the Anglo-Saxon influence on the
Chinese education system.” (28) He deliberately keeps his dis-
tance from the academic world for the sake of self-cultiva-
tion, popular education, and ritual practice.
Examples such as these reveal the uncertain and fluid nature
of categories such as “philosophy” within the new social
space appropriating Confucianism. Despite their relatively
limited scope, these phenomena suggest how change can
occur in diverging directions: whereas becoming a form of
philosophy promised a unique means of “modernising” Con-
fucianism during the last century, different orientations are
no longer unthinkable today, and the ancient “philosophical”
spirit (and accompanying practices) can re-emerge and be
transformed, or retransformed, into a “religious” one.
The new “Confucianism” that is emerging in certain urban
milieus is also challenging the categorisations adopted from
the West in other ways. If “philosophy” seemed to offer
Confucianism a position of refuge during the interwar period
until it could become the object of diverse re-appropriations,
most notably religious ones, more recently, the category of
“science” has undergone equally unexpected transforma-
tions.
The particular case that will concern us below is an effort to
ground Confucianism in a scientific or meta-scientific vision
of the world. This development can be situated in many re-
spects within a context that also stirred up the “qigong fever”
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26. An upcoming article will examine the question of rites and ceremonies today.
27. This connection is not pure form: Luo Yijun was able to come to Hong Kong at the end of Mou
Zongsan’s life and “receive recognition as a disciple” (personal communication, 1997). On Luo Yijun,
see John Makeham, Lost Soul: “Confucianism” in Contemporary Chinese Academic Discourse,
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2008, pp. 252-254.
28. Interview, Qufu, October 2007.
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so well described by David Palmer. (29) Three factors con-
verge in this context: the importance of an official concep-
tion of “science” that was dominated by ideology while
“Mao Zedong Thought” prevailed; the rediscovery, under
chaotic conditions, of knowledge, creeds, and practices
rooted in Chinese tradition; and the rise of cultural national-
ism resulting from contemporary globalisation and a per-
ceived rivalry with the West, an entity sometimes more imag-
inary than real. While the examples cited above show the re-
appropriation of philosophical texts as part of a desire for
self-realisation and redemption of the world, the case to be
explored below illustrates the recovery of the wisdom of the
ancient sages via consideration of the most modern physical
science: the ultimately “religious” vocation of Confucianism
is not to be discerned beyond the worldly path but instead
within the very heart of the most radical forms of scientific
inquiry.
Born into a family of workers, 37-year-old M.W. studied
physics at Peking University and never stopped wondering
about a question that official ideology left unresolved: how
is it possible for great physicists to believe in God? What is
the dimension of reality that existing forms of science appear
unable to account for? These questions led to him to leave
for the United States after finishing his studies, but his brief
stay let him unsatisfied. Upon returning to China and meet-
ing a professor who was a specialist in forest management,
but who in his spare time worked on an annotated version of
Confucian texts, Mr. W.’s discovery of the Chinese classics
convinced him that he had at last found some answers. The
crux of the matter was neither science nor Chinese culture
per se, but the prevailing way in which they were being in-
terpreted in universities. What was necessary was to rethink
the foundations of Confucianism in light of the most recent
developments of physical science in order to find common
inspiration.
As a result, the program of the academy that Mr. W. in-
tends to create (at present the academy only exists virtually
under the name Junde shuyuan, the “Academy of Eminent
Virtue”) is touted on several websites in the following
terms: “Since the second half of the twentieth century, hu-
manity has been faced with serious new problems that have
revealed the limits and defects of Western knowledge.
These shortcomings can be remedied through the rich re-
sources of the principal pillar of Chinese civilisation, Con-
fucianism.” Yet in order to do this, it is necessary, accord-
ing to Mr. W., to distinguish three major orientations within
Confucianism, inspired by the famous “eight propositions”
(bamu) enunciated in the classic text The Great Learning,
which enumerate the progressive steps toward wisdom, from
self-discipline to ordering family life to establishing peace in
the universe. (30) Essentially, these propositions define, re-
spectively, a “realist” Confucianism oriented towards things
(wuxing ruxue) in the hope of increasing knowledge, a
“moral” Confucianism oriented towards the heart/mind
(xinxing ruxue) as well as ethical and religious develop-
ment, and a “communitarian” Confucianism oriented to-
ward the group (qunxing ruxue) and the creation of a har-
monious world. The “realist” orientation is the one that can
provide the foundation for a Confucian reconstruction once
its “scientific” inspiration is taken into account, even if the
“things” (wu) in question are not just material objects but
also their relations with humans. Thus, “the investigation of
things” (gewu) in The Great Learning designates the ex-
perimental study of phenomena; “the extension of knowl-
edge” (zhizhi) reflects a concern for achieving a scientific
and ontological synthesis; and “making one’s intentions sin-
cere” (chengyi) describes the state of mind of the scientist
who is dedicated to rigorous critical thought. (31) While the
effort of self-transformation called for in the Confucian clas-
sic appears reduced to an exclusively realistic and scientific
dimension, it is a fairly peculiar science.
The Confucianism oriented towards things (wuxing),
Mr. W. explains, is of the same spirit as Ilya Pri-
gogine’s new physical science. It’s already a science
of complexity (fuza kexue). This approach is not that
of ordinary science. It is already apparent in the spirit
of Chinese medicine, with its reliance on yin and
yang, and the five elements (yinyang wuxing). This
form of Confucianism is already post-Newtonian in
the same sense that Prigogine’s work is. (32)
The emphasis placed on the interaction of man and nature,
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29. Although based on traditional corporal techniques, the movements that develop in Communist China
under the term qigong (designating the efficacy of respiration) takes on therapeutic then religious
aspects before becoming a political threat. They also posses a very significant “scientific” dimen-
sion, since scientists such as the well-known atomist Qian Xuesen saw in qigong a scientific revo-
lution representing a precious Chinese contribution to modern science before the Communist
authorities condemned the program after 1995. Cf. David Palmer, Qigong Fever, Body, Science and
Utopia in China, New York, Columbia University Press, 2007, pp. 102-135.
30. The Great Learning posits that “It is by investigating things that knowledge is being extended to
the utmost. Knowledge once extended, intention becomes sincere. Once intention is sincere, the
heart is rectified. The heart being rectified, the self is cultivated. The self being cultivated, one’s
family is regulated. One’s family being regulated, one’s State is rightly governed. And when States
are rightly governed, the Great Peace prevails across the universe.” See: “Daxue” (The Great
Learning), in Zhuzi quanti (Complete works of Zhuxi), Shanghai, Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2002,
vol. 6, p. 17.
31. See the Tianya  Forum website: http://www.tianya.cn/publicforum/Content/no100/1/20099.shtml.
32. Interview, Shenzhen, December 2006.
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on holism, and on the respect of complexity renders Confu-
cianism capable of responding to the most concrete needs of
humanity: 
It can promote the respect of the environment with-
out at the same time reducing production. It encour-
ages the evolution of architecture and city planning
that respects sustainable development. (33)
The small network formed out of interest in these ideas in
2006 includes people who have studied the natural sci-
ences, economics, or law. However, those with specific
philosophical training are generally held in suspicion, their
specialisation deemed of little use. The mission is eminently
practical: its goal is to provide the keys of ultimate under-
standing to professionals in positions of real social responsi-
bility. The quasi-millenarian spirit nurturing this perspective
does not rely on wisdom teachings inspired by philosophi-
cal texts but rather on a Confucianism transformed into a
kind of super-science that can satisfy the needs of the fu-
ture: “In basing itself on a Confucianism oriented towards
things, in employing modern language and terminology, and
in completely grounding itself in the cognitive structures of
today, the Junde shuyuan academy intends to train a corps
of generalists in company organisation and management
who will usher in the interpenetration of Eastern and West-
ern civilisations in order to restore the credibility of the
timeless wisdom of ancient sages that can help establish a
comprehensive peace for future generations.” (34)
The legitimacy of such an undertaking is quite clearly de-
rived from two sources: the Confucianism cultivated by
M.W. seeks to root itself both in scientific rationality and in
a sectarian fidelity towards a master “of advanced under-
standing” “who frequents influential circles” and “whose
complex thought must continue to be studied and dissemi-
nated…” It is unlikely that such a vision of Confucianism,
one that could be characterised as “scientological,” is bound
to enjoy a bright future. However, it does provide an inter-
esting illustration of the fluidity of categorisations at work in
the remnants of “Confucianism” today, a fluidity that in-
forms “popular” movements (minjian) in a variety of differ-
ent directions.
F r om flu i dity  t o th e  dis so lu tion  o f  moder nc at eg or ies:  Th e  u topi an  per spec tive
To some extent, certain utopian dimensions of the “Confu-
cian revival” can also be seen as a natural outcome, pro-
jected into the realm of the imagination, of the ongoing
questioning of categories and institutions. This is apparent in
the work of Zhang Xianglong, a prominent university
philosopher who has written a comparative study of Heideg-
ger and Daoist thought. His advocacy of Confucian renewal
has intriguingly evolved from a call for university reform to a
utopian exploration that is no longer related to the academic
world at all.
Zhang Xianglong started out as a participant in a circle of
critical thinkers who traced the intrinsic limits of modern in-
stitutions such as university philosophy departments. Aware
of the easily reductive nature of the neologism “philosophy”
when attempting to define the essence of traditional Chinese
thought, Zhang proposed an alternative concept of
daoshuxue or “the teaching of the arts of the Way (Dao),”
an umbrella term for the introduction of complementary dis-
ciplines based on the spirit of the “six arts” (liushu) of an-
tiquity. The subsequent debate elicited by the proposal high-
lighted, at the same time, the legitimacy of such a question-
ing and the aporiae of the proposed solution, once the re-
flection in question strayed from a systematic assessment of
the historical and anthropological characteristics of university
education in itself. (35)
Zhang Xianglong’s utopian project is to a certain extent the
logical consequence of initial dissatisfaction with modern cat-
egories and institutions. If it is essential for Confucianism to
resist being reduced to a university discipline, political ideol-
ogy, or institutionalised religion, if the genius of Confucian-
ism can only flourish within daily life, within an organic
space that includes the ensemble of its arts and rituals inher-
ited from the past, is it not tempting to imagine the possibil-
ity of re-establishing such a space within the modern world?
It is only a small step to the project, stunning at first, to cre-
ate, with hypothetical state support, a special “zone for the
preservation of Confucian culture” (Rujia wenhua bao-
huqu), originally conceived according to the model of a “nat-
ural park” (ziran baohuqu), but also inspired by observation
of the Amish community in the United States, which offers
the possibility of a pre-industrial mode of life within modern
society. This veritable “reservation” would gather a large
99N o  2 0 0 8 / 3
33. Ibid.
34. Forum cited.
35. See Zhang Xianglong, “‘Zhexue’ de huoguo yu fencun — Du Ruile ‘Ruxue jingyan yu zhexue huayu’
yiwen duhou gan” (Consequences and measures of “philosophy”: Impression of a reading of the
article by J. Thoraval), Zhongguo xueshu, 15, 2003, pp. 242-259; and Joël Thoraval’s response,
“Zongguo xiandai zhexue tizhi de ‘yaoshu’ zuoyong — huiying Zhang Xianglong de jige yijian” (The
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enough population to evolve towards autonomy (zizhi) and
the progressive reconstitution of a “mode of Confucian liv-
ing”: the fundamental role of kinship and clans, rejection of
modern technology, promotion of ritualism and traditional
teachings, self-government under the surveillance of an elite
of scholars and sages, etc. (36) Despite ridicule and vehement
criticism from other intellectuals, this project continues to be
defended by its promoter with the mixture of visionary inspi-
ration and precise logic characteristic of genuine utopian
thinkers. From the standpoint of this study, the crucial point
is that Zhang’s project reflects a double rejection of “top
down Confucianism,” which could only be a form of ideo-
logical instrumentalisation, and of “bottom up Confucian-
ism” rooted exclusively in “popular” initiatives. These ap-
proaches can at best restore the standing of certain frag-
ments of the tradition without re-establishing the foundations
of authentic communal cohesion. (37)
Thus, the rejection of the categorisations and institutions in-
troduced during the twentieth century leads in that specific
case to a radical conclusion: shifting from a critique of the
existing society in the name of Confucianism to the inven-
tion, at the margins of existing society, of an imaginary Con-
fucian society that seeks to be a resource for the achieve-
ment of a millenarian vision for the future all of humanity.A re l i gi on re cogni sed  b y the  st at e?
If theoretical or practical questioning of previous categorisa-
tions has led to the affirmation of a religious dimension to
Confucianism becoming one of the traits that characterises
the astonishing variety of “popular” movements claiming to
be a part of the Confucian tradition today, that dimension
cannot really develop in the public space without an official
recognition on the part of the state. Thus, the start of the
century has seen a resurgence of the debates of the early
Republican era that explored in depth the problem of the re-
lations between religion and politics in a state that had be-
come secularised with the dismantling of the ancient Confu-
cian jiao and the end of its totalising and hegemonic grip of
China’s cultural space.
What status could be accorded to a Confucian religion in
the post-Mao era? (38) Below we will examine three of the
many possible permutations that have been debated on the
mainland since 2000: essentially, Confucianism can be insti-
tutionalised as a religion like all the others that are officially
recognised by the state; or it can seek a more dominant po-
sition through gradual transformation into a veritable “na-
tional teaching” or “state religion” (guojiao); or, halfway be-
tween the first two options, it can be cast as a modern “civil
religion,” modelled notably on the American example. 
The first of these three options is already a reality, but it has
emerged at the margins of the post-Mao environment. The
two other options remain at the level of aspiration, but their
importance should not be underestimated in the context of a
somewhat revived Chinese nationalism. We can only at-
tempt here to establish the logic that is appropriate to each
of the options, while keeping in mind the challenges in-
evitably posed by the question of their compatibility with a
pluralistic and democratic political space.Un u s in ter  par es :  Th e  emerg en c e  of  a“ sixt h r e l ig ion ? ”
Advocates for state recognition of Confucianism as a new of-
ficial religion that would benefit from the same status as the
other religious denominations such as Christianity and Bud-
dhism regularly point to precedents elsewhere in the region,
notably in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong.
In Indonesia, the ethnically Chinese population has for a
century supported Confucian religious organisations such as
the Khong Kauw Hwee. After independence, relations be-
tween the Chinese community and the new nationalist au-
thorities were volatile, shifting from tolerance to persecution.
Despite its emphasis on belief in one god, the official ideol-
ogy of pancasila briefly made possible the recognition of
Confucianism as one of the six official religions prior to the
repressive policies of President Suharto, which limited the
possibilities for religious expression to either dissimulation or
conversion. Nevertheless, since the election of President
Wahid in 1999, a Confucian religion has been reconstituted
and strengthened, under the authority of an administrative
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37. Interview, Beijing, June 2006.
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A Confucian school in Hong Kong
© Sébastien Billioud
organ, the MATAKIN. It now has around 100 churches
and its own clergy, rituals, and official ceremonies. (39)
A colonial context also led to the establishment of an official
Confucian religion in Hong Kong, although recognition on
the part of the British authorities did not ultimately generate
the same massive developments as the highly organised
Christian churches. The nature of this religious Confucian-
ism that has evolved outside of or at the periphery of the
mainland is predictably singular by virtue of colonial influ-
ences and inevitable accommodation to locally dominant re-
ligions, Islam in the case of Indonesia, and Christianity and
Buddhism in the case of Hong Kong. (40) However, the doc-
trinal elements are probably of less importance to intellectu-
als on the mainland today than the existence of an institu-
tionalised Confucian religion recognised by state power.
Hong Kong is particularly important in this respect for three
reasons. First of all, the Special Administrative Region’s insti-
tutional Confucianism represents the continuation, under new
circumstances, of an evolution that began during the Republi-
can era: what can be characterised as the attempt to create an
“ecclesiastic Confucianism.” If Confucianism is one of the six
official religions today, it is thanks to the Confucian Academy
(kongjiao xueyuan) founded by Chen Huanzhang after his ar-
rival in Hong Kong in 1930; its history is thus linked to the
avatars of the Confucian Association (Kongjiao hui) of the
period extending from 1910 to 1930 discussed above. 
Furthermore, the activities of this academy within Hong
Kong society are living proof of Confucianism’s ability to
take on the trappings of an organised religion like other de-
nominations. Indeed, not only does it engage in ritual cele-
bration and charitable work, it also plays a part in educating
children, through its several schools, and in politics: as with
other denominations, its representatives are members of the
electoral college for the office of Chief Executive of Hong
Kong’s government. 
Under the leadership of its president, Tong Yun-kai (Tang
Enjia), (41) a wealthy Hong Kong tycoon who identifies him-
self as a rushang (a Confucian entrepreneur), the Academy
has taken on a new visibility, no longer hesitating to organ-
ise large-scale gatherings, notably on the occasion of Confu-
cius’s birthday: in October 2007, the Hong Kong stadium
was the site for a massive ceremony attended by representa-
tives of other religions. The event was enough of an attrac-
tion that one of the authors of this study ran into activists
from the mainland whom he had previously met during un-
official celebrations of Confucius’s birth staged in Shan-
dong. (42)
The Academy assumes an even greater role, for the pur-
poses of this study, through the influence it exerts on the
mainland. Its activities are varied: renovation of temples ded-
icated to Confucius, erection around the country of monu-
mental statues of the old sage, construction of “Confucian”
hospitals, and sponsorship of a variety of academic projects.
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39. A Confucian Religion Association (Khong Kauw Hwee or Kongjiaohui) was created in 1918. On recog-
nition, near independence (1945), of a Confucian religion in 1965, because of or despite the state
ideology (article 29 of the 1945 constitution stipulates that the country’s religions must recognise
one God), cf. Yingzhong Yao, “Who is a Confucian Today? A Critical Reflection on the Issues
Concerning Confucian Identities in Modern Times,” Journal of Contemporary Religion, vol. 16, no. 3,
2001. pp. 322-324; and Heriyanto Yang, “The History and Legal Position of Confucianism in Post-
Independence Indonesia,” Marburg Journal of Religion (electronic version only), vol. 10, no. 1, August
2005.
40. The religious Confucianism that has developed in Indonesia centred on the cult of Confucius can be
considered a new religion, where Heaven is sovereign and Confucius is treated as a prophet (nabi).
Chee-Beng Tang, who takes up the work of C.A. Coppell, compares this situation with Malaysia’s:
“Chinese Religion in Malaysia: A General Overview,” Asian Folklore Studies, vol. 42, no. 2, (1983),
pp. 217-252.
41. Tong Yun-kai’s activism in China and around the world has produced an impressive collection of
speeches in a series of works: Tang Enjia zun Kong zhi lü (Tong Yun-kai’s Confucian Journey), Hong
Kong, Xianggang kongjiao xueyuan rongyu chuban, 2004. 
42. Observation, Hong Kong, October 2007. Although the newspapers the following day claimed that
40,000 participated in the ceremonies, this figure is surely an exaggeration; the seats in the stadi-
um were not filled. Nevertheless, the crowd was impressive. Among the other major projects of the
Confucian Academy has been the request to erect a Confucius Memorial that “would constitute the
base in Hong Kong for the diffusion of the Confucian religion (kongjiao) and of Confucianism
(ruxue).”
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Tong Yun-kai (Tang Enjia), 
the leader of the Confucian Academy 
© Sébastien Billioud
Confucius’ birthday ceremony combined with the 10 year-
celebration of the handover, Hong Kong stadium, 2007. 
© Sébastien Billioud 
These concrete actions are manifestations of four goals: to
establish Confucianism as a full-fledged religion, to establish
Confucius’s birthday as an official national holiday, to pro-
mote the comprehensive incorporation of Confucian princi-
ples into the nation’s educational program, and finally, to cre-
ate study halls dedicated to the master (Kongshen jiaotang)
or Confucian Youth Associations (Kongjiao qingnian hui) in
cities across the country in the hope that Confucianism can
once again penetrate daily life. (43)
Two major preoccupations can be discerned in the words
and writings of the Academy’s leaders. Consistent with a
perspective that can be traced back to Kang Youwei, their
efforts at proselytism are deemed necessary to stem the wor-
rying spread of Christianity, a menace before which the re-
sistance of Buddhism and Daoism is considered insuffi-
cient. (44) This anxiety is rooted in concern about the conser-
vation of Confucianism as the cornerstone of national spirit.
In fact, the publications of the Academy reveal a patriotism
that, for all its different agenda, can easily be integrated with
the official ideological discourse coming from the main-
land. (45)
Not only would the requested bank holidays offer a chance
to “meditate upon the meaning of our country’s cultural her-
itage,” the Confucian religion would also be likely to satisfy
the need to “reinforce national cohesion and unity”
(qianghua minzu de tuanjie yu ningjuli). Confucian teaching
is the best possible contribution to the rise of the “spiritual
civilisation” that the Communist authorities claim to be pro-
moting to complement the “material civilisation,” the politi-
cal, economic, and technological order that the new capital-
ist development is making possible.
Despite growing material means and ambitions, the activities
promoted in Hong Kong carry the mark of a certain reli-
gious and political pluralism: Confucianism is to be instituted
as a religion comparable to the universal religions, although
worthy of the special attention of the Chinese state. How-
ever, other movements dedicated to promoting Confucian-
ism as a hegemonic religious institution are at work, not at
the periphery but in the very heart of Chinese society. A
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43. There are details on all these points on the Confucian Academy website. See http://www.confu-
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44. Interview with Tong Yun-kai, Hong Kong, January 2008.
45. On this point, see the booklet distributed during the ceremony at Hong Kong Stadium in 2007 cele-
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Confucius’ birthday celebration, Queen Elizabeth stadium, Hong Kong, 2008.  
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particularly radical example of this ten-
dency will be the subject of the next sec-
tion of this study.
T ow ard s h egemon y :  A  “s tat e  r e l i gion ” ?
The prospect of Confucianism being
promoted in the future as a national teaching or state religion
(the Chinese expression guojiao allows for a certain degree
of ambiguity) has become a shared belief among certain rad-
ical conservatives. While the idea of reviving “political Con-
fucianism” emerged at the beginning of the 1990s with the
intellectual Jiang Qing, who linked his position in an erudite
fashion with the Gongyangxue school, (46) the case of Kang
Xiaoguang at the beginning of the century is particularly in-
teresting, given the brutal frankness with which this sociol-
ogy professor at the People’s University and member of the
brain trust of the former prime minister, Zhu Rongji, ex-
presses himself:
Is it not a scandal that in China Confucianism does
not have its own places of worship while any old
Protestant group has a church? Is it normal that all
the Temples of Culture are either deserted or only
open to tourists? Shouldn’t the state be more con-
cerned about what constitutes the fundamental teach-
ing of the Chinese nation? (47)
It is fairly obvious, however, that he is less concerned about
the vitality of a spiritual or religious orientation than with
searching for the most effective means to promote, with the
support of the government, “cultural nationalism,” which he
feels is necessary in the face of contemporary globalisation.
In a book entitled Governing Humanely (Renzheng): The
Third Way of Chinese Political Development, in which
Kang opposes both Marxist orthodoxy and Western liberal-
ism, he emphasises the following points: The teaching that
needs to be promoted is indissolubly religious and political.
The socio-cultural order that should be instituted shares a
certain similitude with a “quasi-religious system” in that it
promotes a return to the ancient ideal in which there is no
separation of the exercise of power from ethical teachings.
While such an argument, informed by the ambiguity that
characterises the traditional notion of jiao (teaching), can
easily be championed for tactical ends, Kang also clearly in-
sists upon the necessity of developing the strictly religious
potential of Confucianism: 
Confucian teaching (rujiao) needs to permeate daily
life; it must become the religion of the entire nation.
In the end, it is only by becoming the religion of the
people as a whole that it can become operative in
daily life. (48)
The state plays a crucial role in such an undertaking: it must
“support the teaching of Confucianism (rujiao) and grant it
the status of national teaching (guojiao).” (49)
Despite its sometimes archaic vocabulary, Kang’s concep-
tion is clearly opposed to the imperial past: what unifies the
diffusion of teaching (jiao) with political practice is no
longer the rituals of yore but a modern ideology (not with-
out its own ceremonial aspect) inspired by an instrumental
rationality. Its difference from certain “popular” movements
(minjian), which harbour real suspicions toward any “offi-
cial” initiative, is also evident. For Kang, “Confucianisation”
is a top-down affair, its capacity to be a future “national reli-
gion” being tied to confidence in the totalising action of state
power to shape the political, educational, and culture
spheres.
Other works by Kang Xiaoguang leave no room for ambigu-
ity as far as the political orientation of this “quasi-religious”
project is concerned. In a text entitled “The Principles of
Cultural Nationalism,” he asserts that “the goal of transform-
ing Confucian teaching into national teaching” (rujiao wei
guojiao) is to foster the cultural renaissance of China and
further its rise as a great world power. Referring to Kang
Youwei, he insists on the fact that “Confucianism was never
a mere school of thought: it fulfilled an educational/transfor-
mational function (jiaohua) as the religion of all the people
(quanmin zongjiao) thanks to the support of the state (guo-
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2007 Confucius ceremonies in Hong Kong. 
On the board it is written: “I love my China, 
I sing the praises of the Motherland”
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jia zhichi).” Explicitly presented as an ideological ensemble,
cultural nationalism must accomplish three tasks: promote
cultural heritage (zhengli guogu), mobilise society (shehui
dongyuan), and recreate a system or a new set of institutions
(zhiduhua). A new, specially-trained elite would naturally
take on the role of mediators between the state, as initiator,
and the various popular movements that would need to be
controlled. (50) Such a radical position has elicited reactions
in intellectual circles, and while certain ideologues are some-
what sympathetic, the official discourse maintains a prudent
distance from such maximalism, which could turn into a
source of instability. (51)
A fu tu r e  “ c ivi l  re l i gio n” ?
Of interest in the current debate is a position that represents
a kind of compromise between simple religious pluralism and
the temptations of religious hegemony. Since the beginning
of the century, debate over the possibility of a Chinese “civil
religion” illustrates not only the influence of diverse Western
“theologico-political” experiences, both European and
American, but also the difficulties or perhaps the aporiae of
a future religious institutionalisation of Confucianism within
a liberal or democratic public space.
Chen Ming, the founder of the review Yuandao, became in-
stantly famous in the second half of the 1990s for his de-
fence of a “contemporary mainland Confucianism” (dalu de
xin rujia) that defined itself in opposition to the metaphysi-
cal tenor of the generation of refugee philosophers in Hong
Kong and Taiwan. Close to the philosopher Li Zehou –
both are actually natives of Hunan province – and inter-
ested, like Li, in a pragmatist interpretation of Chinese cul-
ture, Chen rejected the construct of “philosophical systems”
in favour of a practical, social, and popular vocation for mod-
ern Confucianism. (52) However, the question of a possible
religious status for Confucianism within post-communist so-
ciety has gradually become pivotal for him, inspired by the
American model of “a civil religion.”
Thus for Chen Ming, “civil religion (gongmin zongjiao) is
not merely one of the possible brands of Confucian renais-
sance: it is the way by which this renaissance can be accom-
plished.” The reference is borrowed from a well-known study
by the American sociologist Robert Bellah of civil religion in
the United States. Bellah begins by citing the numerous ref-
erences to God in the speeches of American presidents and
public discourse in the United States, despite the official sec-
ularism spelled out in the First Amendment of the U.S. Con-
stitution: 
...the separation of church and state has not denied the
political realm a religious dimension. Although matters
of personal religious belief, worship, and association
are considered to be strictly private affairs, there are, at
the same time, certain common elements of religious
orientation that the great majority of Americans share.
These have played a crucial role in the development of
American institutions and still provide a religious di-
mension for the whole fabric of American life, includ-
ing the political sphere. This public religious dimension
is expressed in a set of beliefs, symbols, and rituals that
I am calling American civil religion. (53)
If the idea of a civil religion attracts Chen Ming, it is because it
seems consistent with his own essentially popular and pragmatic
orientation as opposed to more abstract and dogmatic ones: 
Mou Zongsan’s Confucianism as the ‘perfect teaching’
seems too informed by emotion, Jiang Qing’s notion
that China should be a Confucian state that unifies the
political and religious (zhengjiao heyi de rujiao guojia)
is surely too simplistic, and Kang Xiaoguang’s program
to transform Confucianism into a state religion (rujiao
guojiaohua) is hardly applicable. However, civil reli-
gion is fundamentally oriented toward the foundation
of society: it is compatible with freedom, democracy,
and the constitution, and it can contribute to their
proper functioning. (54)
More precisely, for Chen, this new concept constitutes the
long-sought solution to two recurrent difficulties, one theoreti-
cal and the other practical. The theoretical difficulty, which is
well known, arises because of the unsuitability of the Western
notion of religion: 
While it is certainly true that calling Confucianism a re-
ligion engenders considerable theoretical problems,
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Anshen liming or the Religious Dimension of Confucianism
seeing it as a civil religion involves fewer difficulties. As
long as the concept of civil religion is not too rigidly
based on the American example or on the modern con-
text of the notion of ‘civil’ (gongmin) but, instead, is un-
derstood in the larger sense as designating communal-
ity (gonggongxing), then it is no exaggeration to say
that China is the country where civil religion was most
a reality. (55)
Confucian lore is filed with the equivalents of the heroes,
sites, and necessary sacred rituals that Bellah writes of in the
context of American history. A modern civil religion would
make it possible to formalise and rationalise these symbols
within the “life of the state” (guojia shenghuo).
The issue of institutionalisation is the crux of the practical
difficulty: Confucianism possesses “structural characteristics
that on the one hand meld with popular beliefs, and that on
the other hand inherently blend with political power.” (56)
The fact that Confucianism has been confined to the people
(minjian) since the abolition of the Empire is certainly a
point of weakness, but the future civil religion could thus
nourish itself through those elements that have remained vi-
brant rather than on ideological discourse removed from the
people. (57) Thus this new concept comes to function as a
force of mediation between the vitality of popular Confu-
cianism and a hoped-for modern political regime. (58)
There is no doubt that the debate over the future of Confu-
cianism as civil religion confronts two major obstacles. The
first is naturally the application to the Chinese context of
conceptions that are profoundly conditioned by American
historical experience and that represent only one of the pos-
sible interactions of the political and the religious. (59) Robert
Bellah was the first to put an accent on the necessary criti-
cal dimension to the notion of “civil religion” in the United
States, without which it can easily degenerate into a kind of
“national self-idolatry” tantamount to “American Shinto-
ism.” (60) The second problem arises from the vague way in
which this term is now often used and applied without dis-
tinction to pre-modern situations. From this perspective, it is
probably regrettable that Robert Bellah himself recently pro-
posed using the term “civil religion” to characterise the Con-
fucianism the Qing Dynasty Manchu elite propagated as a
means of assuring the political unity of the Empire. (61) Chi-
nese advocates of a national religion have not failed to make
use of Bellah’s strange anachronism. Such loose application
of the term can only encourage the sentiment of a fictional
continuity with the imperial past and complicate the debate
over the indivisible historical link between the idea of civil
religion and the modern idea of a society of citizens: indeed,
doesn’t conflating civil religion with traditional state religion
obscure the fact that the concept only makes sense within a
modern democratic context where political legitimacy is no
longer derived from Heaven but from the people?
Beyond the concrete policies that they are likely to foster, the
three perspectives under debate (Confucianism as a specific,
state, or civil religion) are especially interesting in the way that
they highlight the difficulties faced by the various attempts to
institutionalise Confucianism. The difficulties are further com-
plicated by the fact that they are as much the product of the
particularity of Chinese cultural tradition as of the uncertainty
facing China’s future as a political community in its relations
with the democratic model that is Western it in its origin.Co nclus ion
What conclusions can be reached after this brief examina-
tion of religious developments within the current “Confucian
revival”?
The importance of these developments considering either the
multiple parallel developments discernible within Chinese so-
ciety today (whether in terms of the various flourishing forms
of Buddhism, the unexpected effects of Christian proselytism,
or the emergence of new sectarian movements claiming tradi-
tion as inspiration) or the diverse opposition they have in-
evitably engendered should not, of course, be exaggerated.
Ultimately, appreciating the future vitality of this phenome-
non requires taking into account two essential tensions. First
of all, there is a sort of intermediate space, which remains
ill-defined, between the force of spiritual quests that some-
times translate more into a greater desire for religion than ac-
tual religiosity and the reality of individual and communal
105N o  2 0 0 8 / 3
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. The idea of a Chinese civil religion based on Confucianism is also defended by certain Christian
intellectuals. Thus for the sociologist of religion Yang Fenggang, such a program would guarantee
both religious pluralism, as in the United States, and the necessary promotion of Chinese culture.
But it is difficult not to notice how, despite his liberalism, this Protestant thinker’s encouragement of
a civil religion that breaks with the post-communist state’s official atheism favors a surreptitious
Christianisation of Confucian doctrine, emphasising in particular “the accent on the transcendent
dimension of Heaven (tian) endowed with will…” Yang Fenggang, “Duiyu rujiao zhi wei jiao de she-
huixue sikao” (Soiological reflections on Confucianism as religion), 2005, website of the review
Yuandao: /dispbbs.asp?boardID=2&ID=26896&page=15. 
59. Cf. for example Marcel Gauchet’s remarks based on Bellah in La religion dans la démocratie. Paris,
Gallimard, Folio, 1998, p. 69
60. Robert Bellah, op. cit., p. 168, note.
61. Robert Bellah, “Gongmin zongjiao yu shehui chongtu” (Civil religion and social conflicts), Ershiyi shiji
(Twenty-first century), Hong Kong, 2003, electronic edition: : http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ics/21c/
supplem/essay/9501079g.htm.
c
h
in
a
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
es
Ar t i c l es
practices that are still dispersed and seeking social and insti-
tutional space. The creativity of the popular movements ac-
tive today unfolds within this interval between the real and
the imaginary, expressing itself in forms that are by definition
difficult to anticipate. But there is another unresolved tension
between an aspiration towards official institutionalised status
and an attachment to the autonomy of Confucian teaching,
the value of which is to be found most prominently within
popular manifestations. The role of the state relative to a new
Confucianism remains very complicated due to the twists and
turns of the last century’s political history.
It is for these reasons that an appreciation of the potential
for religious revival requires considering a form of mediation
that traditionally established a link between individual senti-
ments and collective behaviour as much as between the
world of political authority and ordinary practices: what we
have in mind, of course, are rites (li) that have always been
essential to the diverse expressions of “Confucianism.”
Is a modern Confucian-inspired neo-ritualism possible? Our
next study will pursue this question. •
• Translated by Christopher Storey
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Glossary
anshen liming 安身立命
bamu 八目
baojiao 保教
benxin  本心
chanhui 懺悔
chaoyue de cunzai 超越的存在
Chen Huanzhang 陳煥章
Chen Ming 陳明
chengfo chengsheng 成佛成聖
chengyi 誠意
citang 祠堂
dalu de xin rujia 大陸的新儒家
eguo 惡果
exin 惡心
fannao 煩惱
fanzui 犯罪
fuza kexue 複雜科學
gewu 格物
gongfu 功夫
gonggongxing 公共性
gongmin 公民
gongmin zongjiao 公民宗教
Gongyangxue 公羊學
guanfang 官方
guojia shenghuo 國家生活
guojia zhichi 國家支持
guojiao 國教
Guoxueyuan 國學院
Jiang Qing 蔣慶
jiaoyujia 教育家
jiao 教
jiaobu 教部
jiaotu 教徒
jingjie 境界
jingshen shenming 精神神明
Junde shuyuan 俊德書院
Kang Xiaoguang 康曉光
Kang Youwei 康有為
kexue 科學
kongjiao 孔教
Kongjiao hui 孔教會
Kongjiao qingnian hui 孔教青年會
Kongjiao xueyuan 孔教學院
Kongsheng jiaotang 孔聖教堂
Kongzi jinian tang 孔子紀念堂
laoban 老闆
Liang Qichao 梁啟超
Liang Shuming 梁漱溟
lixing de sikao 理性的思考
lixue 理學
liushu 六術
Luo Yijun 羅義俊
Ma Yifu 馬一孚
Mengzi 孟子
mixin 迷信
minjian rujia 民間儒家
minzu 民族
Mou Zongsan 牟宗三
Nan Huaijin 南懷謹
pianmian 片面
Pinghe shuyuan 平和書院
pusa 菩薩
Qian Hang 錢杭
qianghua minzu de 強化民族的
tuanjie yu ningjuli 團結與凝聚力
quanmin zongjiao 全民宗教
qunxing ruxue 群性儒學
renlei 人類
renlei de mingyun 人類的命運
renlei guisu 人類歸宿
de fangxiang 的方曏
renzheng 仁政
rujia 儒家
rujia fuxing 儒家復興
rujia de weida 儒家的偉大
rujia wenhua baohuqu 儒家文化保護區
rujia zhexue 儒家哲學
rujiao guojiaohua 儒教國教化
rujiao wei guojiao 儒教為國教
rushang 儒商
ruxue 儒學
ruzhe 儒者
shehui dongyuan 社會動員
shengxian 聖賢
shidafu 士大夫
shidao 師道
shuyuan 書院
Tang Enjia 湯恩佳
tongcaixing 通才型
Wang Caigui 王財貴
Wang Guowei 王國維
Wang Yangming 王陽明
weile geren 為了個人
wu 物
wuran 污染
wuxing 物性
wuxing ruxue 物性儒學
xiaodao 孝道
xiaoren 小人
xin 信
Xin qingnian 新青年
xitian 西天
Xinti yu xingti 心體與性體
xinxing ruxue 心性儒學
xuebu 學部
xueshu 學術
xuezhe 學者
Yan Fu 嚴復
Yashengmiao 亞聖廟
yi men 一門
yinyang wuxing 陰陽五行
yongyuan zai 永遠在
Yongzheng 雍正
Yuandao 原道
Zhang Xianglong 張祥龍
zhenzheng de xuewen 真正的學問
zhengjiao heyi 政教合一
zhengjiao heyi de 政教合一的
rujiao guojia 儒教國家
zhengli guogu 整理國故
zhexue 哲學
zhiduhua 制度化
zhizhi 致知
zhun zongjiao tixi 准宗教體系
ziran baohuqu 自然保護區
zizhi 自治
zongjiao 宗教
Zoucheng 鄒城
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